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Abstract: Location verification has witnessed significant attention in vehicular communication due to the 
growth in number of location based Intelligent Transport System (ITS) applications.  The Traditional 
cryptography based techniques have been suggested to secure and verify location of vehicles. The traditional 
techniques increase protocol complexity and computational overhead due to the adhoc nature of vehicular 
network environments. In this context, this paper proposes two layered Location Information Verification cum 
Security (LIVES) technique based on Transferable Belief Model (TBM).  In layer 1, Tiles based Verification 
(TV) is performed using the concepts of virtual tiles on roads and received signal strength. In layer 2, TBM 
based verification is performed. Specifically, the belief of the presence of a vehicle on each tiles, and the 
belief of the presence of a vehicle as neighbour of other neighbouring vehicles are combined as collective 
belief to attest the location claim of a neighbour vehicle. The performance of LIVES is evaluated with road-
based and map-based network environments. The single, mixed and multiple adversary vehicles are 
considered in both the network environments. The comparative performance evaluations attest the benefits of 
LIVES as compared to the Verification and Inference of Position using Anonymous beaconing (A-VIP) and 
without using LIVES (W-LIVES). 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, vehicular communication has witnessed remarkable attention in both academia and industries 
[1]. In vehicular communication, the major location based Intelligent Transport System (ITS) applications 
include cooperative traffic monitoring, blind crossing, prevention of collisions, control of traffic flows, nearby 
information services, and Internet access in vehicles [2]. To realize these location based applications, 
geographic routing has got foremost attention for information dissemination in vehicular communication as 
compared to the other routing techniques [3-5]. In geographic routing, location of neighbouring vehicles is 
obtained by broadcasting location query in neighbourhood [6,7]. The location query creates a security hole for 
malicious location attacker vehicles. The malicious vehicles disrupt the functionality of geographic routing by 
either introducing false location claim or modifying the location claim of other vehicles [8-10]. Although, 
various techniques have been suggested to verify the location claim yet, the dependency of these techniques 
on cryptography reduces the applicability in vehicular traffic environments where majority of location based 
applications require real time response [11-13].   
In this context, this paper proposes a Location Information Verification cum Security (LIVES) 
technique based on Transferable Belief Model (TBM) for geographic routing in Vehicular Adhoc Networks 
(VANETs). The technique is an extension of our initial work in terms of mathematical modelling, map-based 
network evaluation, metrics and comparative analysis of results between map-based and road-based networks 
[14]. The location verification is carried out into two layers. In layer 1, Tiles based Verification (TV) is 
performed using the concepts of virtual tiles on roads and received signal strength. In layer 2, TBM based 
verification is performed. Specifically, the belief of presence of a vehicle on each tiles, and the belief of 
presence of a vehicle as neighbour of other neighbouring vehicles are combined as collective belief to attest 
the location claim a neighbour vehicle. An algorithm for secured geographic routing (SGR) is developed 
utilizing the two layered location verification. Simulations are carried out in NS-2 considering single, mixed, 
and multiple adversary vehicles in road-based and map-based network environments.  
The rest of the paper is organized in following sections. Section 2 qualitatively reviews location 
verification in VANETs. Section 3 presents the detail of LIVES as theoretical and mathematical modelling. 
The simulation setup and results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes the work presented in this 
paper.   
2. Related Work 
In this section, a qualitative review on location verification in VANETs is presented. A-VIP has been 
suggested as a server based approach for location verification [15]. The verification technique infers the 
correct location of the vehicles who claim fake locations. It uses a trusted server to verify location claim. 
Although the technique is claimed to be promising, yet the requirement of server for location verification 
reduces the applicability of the technique due to the growing importance of distributed approach in VANETs. 
The Time of Flight (ToF) based location verification technique has been suggested using cooperative 
neighbour vehicles [16]. The two vehicles, namely, verifier and co-operator verify location claim of a vehicle. 
Although, ToF based location verification is suitable for static network yet, its accuracy reduces in dynamic 
vehicular networks. Additionally the impact of vehicle speed on ToF based distance calculation has not 
considered.  
The Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) issue in location verification has been addressed using cooperative 
neighbour vehicles [17]. The angle based distance measurement with control packet communication has been 
utilized.  Although angle based distance measurement is appropriate for static network yet, the accuracy of the 
distance measurement could not be guaranteed in dynamic vehicular networks. The major location 
verification techniques for VANETs have been explored [18]. The techniques are based on autonomous 
sensors, cooperative sensors, and digital street map. A Neighbour Position Verification (NPV) technique has 
been suggested for Mobile Adhoc Networks (MANETs) [19]. NPV is a reactive and cooperative technique 
based on cryptography. Although authors have claimed that NPV verifies both single and multiple adversary 
vehicles yet, the dependency on cryptography reduces the applicability in vehicular networks. Due to the page 
limitation, readers are advised to consult the literature [20-22] where location verification has been critically 
reviewed.    
3. LIVES 
In this section, two layered location verification technique is proposed.  
3.1 Layer 1: Tiles based Verification  
In this layer, virtual tiles on the roads are considered.  These tiles are utilized to verify location claim of 
neighbour vehicles. The forwarding vehicle     calculates the location of tiles within transmission range using 
own location and the architecture of tiles (see Fig. 1). Let   is the set of tiles and   is the set of neighbour 
vehicles of    . The ideal received signal power     
 from     tile    can be calculated by     using shadow 
fading model as expressed by Eq. (1).  
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where      
  is the transmitted signal power from tile    ,   denotes the constant representing antenna 
characteristics and channel attenuation,   represents the path loss exponent,         represents the distance 
between     and   ,    is the reference distance for antenna, and   represents a Gaussian random variable. The 
distance         can be calculated using the latitude and longitude location of tile             and 
vehicle           . The received signal power     
  from    neighbour vehicle    can be calculated by     as 
expressed by Eq. (2). 
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where     
  is the transmitted signal power from vehicle   ,         is the distance between     and   . An 
approximation method is proposed to verify the location claim            of  
   neighbour vehicle.  For each 
neighbour vehicle, an approximation set is constructed based on the number of tiles on which the presence of 
a particular neighbour vehicle can be approximated. The approximation set     for vehicle    can be 
constructed as expressed by Eq. (3).  
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where    represents the  
   tile and   represents the threshold value used to determine the equality of two 
received signals from vehicle     and tile   . The probability    
   of TV of a neighbour vehicle     can be 
expressed as given by Eq. (4). 
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A neighbour vehicle passes TV if its probability    
   is greater than a threshold value  , i.e., (   
    ) . A set 
of steps for TV is provided in Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm-1: Tiles based Verification (TV) )(),( iyx tL ii
)(),( syx vL ss
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Fig. 1. Transmission range of a vehicle with virtual tiles 
Notations: 
     : Set of Secure Vehicles passing TV  
    : Set of One hop Neighbour Vehicles 
   : Current forwarding vehicle;  : Threshold for TV  
Input:                                             Output:       
1.          
2.                            
3.   for             
4.        if (   is in neighbour list of any other   
                 vehicles        )  
5.              determine      using equation (3) 
6.      calculate    
   using equation (4) 
7.              if (   
    )  
8.                              ⋃   
9.               endif 
10.        endif 
11.   endfor 
12. exit 
 
3.2 Layer 2: TBM based Verification  
 
In this layer, verification of location is carried out using TBM for the neighbouring vehicles who clear TV 
at layer 1 [23]. TBM is based on two sequential computation phases, namely, credal and pignistic. In credal 
phase, belief functions are used for quantifying and updating individual beliefs whereas in pignistic phase, 
quantified beliefs are transformed into probabilities, and are combined to take a decision. In credal phase of 
LIVES, firstly, the belief of the presence of each neighbouring vehicle on each tile      is calculated by the 
current forwarder vehicle    . The belief of a vehicle    about the presence on a tile   is represented by         . 
Secondly, the belief of the presence of a vehicle   as a neighbour is calculated by other neighbouring vehicles 
      
         of the current forwarder. The belief calculated by vehicle       
        about a 
neighbouring vehicle   is represented by        . In pignistic phase of LIVES, the collective belief   
  of the 
location information of a neighbour vehicle    is computed by the forwarding vehicle     by combining the 
tiles based belief         and neighbour vehicle based belief        which are calculated in the credal phase. The 
calculation of tiles based belief, neighbour vehicle based belief, and collective belief in the context of TBM 
are described in following sections.  
3.2.1 Frame of Discernment: In TBM, a set   containing each possible states of a system is called Frame of 
Discernment (FoD). In the context of location verification system, the set of location of tiles   of current 
forwarder vehicles is considered as FoD, and can be expressed as given by Eq. (5). 
                              (5) 
where            represents the location information of tile    in terms of latitude and longitude.  
3.2.2 Tiles based Belief: The belief of the presence of a neighbour vehicle    on a tile      is represented 
by        . It can be calculated as expressed by Eq. (6).  
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where     
 and     
  can be calculated using Eq. (1) and (2), respectively.  The tiles based belief        is 
calculated w.r.t. each tile by the current forwarder vehicle. This belief is not used solely to make decision on 
the correctness of location information. However, it contributes on decision making as a component with 
another component; i.e., individual belief of neighbouring vehicles, which is calculated in the next section. 
These two component beliefs collectively contribute on the decision regarding the correctness of location 
information of a particular neighbour vehicle.  
3.2.3 Neighbour based Belief: The belief of the presence of a vehicle    as neighbor of a vehicle    
           is represented by        . The number of metrics are used to calculate        including number of 
outgoing packets    𝑢  routed though vehicle   , number of other neighbouring vehicles   𝑛 having an entry 
of    into their neighbour table, difference of speeds  𝑠  between    a d   , number of incoming 
packets   𝑛though vehicle   , and percentage quality 𝑞    
  of received signal strength as compared to the 
ideal received signal. It can be calculated as expressed by Eq. (7). 
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where   𝑢    𝑛      𝑛     represent the weights of corresponding parameters which are used to adjust 
the impact of the parameters, and   𝑢 
    𝑛
   𝑠 
     𝑛
   𝑞  
   represent the threshold values of the corresponding 
parameters. The values of these weight parameters and thresholds are highly oriented to network 
environments. The values considered in the implementation are mentioned in Table 1.   
3.2.4 Pignistic Transformation for Collective Belief: The collective belief    
    𝑒  of a vehicle       
    is 
calculated by combining the tiles based belief obtained using Eq. (6) and neighbour based belief obtained 
using Eq. (7) to take the final decision regarding the presence of a vehicle as neighbour. The calculation 
carried out by current forwarding vehicle     is known as pignistic transformation in the context of TBM. The 
collective belief can be calculated as expressed by Eq. (8). 
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Where   and          represent the subscript used for referring tiles. The collective belief calculation 
   
    𝑒  is the addition of three major components. The first component represents the individual belief 
attached with each tile regarding the considered vehicle   . The second component represents the individual 
belief attached with the considered vehicle    . The third component represents the individual disbelief 
attached with each tile regarding the considered vehicle   . The collective belief    
    𝑒   is used to verify the 
location claim of a neighbour vehicle in geographic routing.  
3.2.5 The Verification Framework: The two layered location verification framework is presented as a Secured 
Geographic Routing (SGR) algorithm for VANETs (see Algorithm 2). In the 1
st
 layer (steps 1 and 2), tiles 
based verification is performed to initially select legitimate vehicles, and thus, avoid malicious vehicles. In the 
2
nd
 layer (steps 3, 4 and 5), TBM based verification is performed to attest the location claim of the vehicles 
selected in the 1
st
 layer. Specifically, the belief of the presence of a vehicle on each tiles is calculated in step 3 
using Eq. (6). The belief of the presence of a vehicle as neighbour is calculated in step 4 using Eq. (7). The 
tiles based belief of step 3 and neighbour based belief of step 4 is combined in step 5 using Eq. (8) to calculate 
collective belief of a neighbour vehicle to take the final decision regarding the presence of the vehicle as 
neighbour.  The steps 6, 7, and 8 are used to select a vehicle as next forwarder which has maximum collective 
belief among neighbour vehicles.    
Algorithm 2: Secure Geographic Routing (SGR) 
Notations 
     Current Forwarding Vehicle,    
    Set of Secure Vehicles passing TV test,     Destination Vehicle,     Source 
Vehicle,       Next hop Vehicle,     : Set of One hop Neighbour Vehicles,  : Set of tiles of     
Input       𝑢 
    𝑛
   𝑠 
     𝑛
   𝑞  
     𝑢    𝑛      𝑛      ; Output:           
Process 
1. initialization 
                        and            
2. find       by executing    Algorithm 1 
3. for each (      )  
            calculate         using equation (6) 
     endfor 
4. for each (        
  )  
 calculate        using equation (7) 
    endfor  
5. for each (        
  )  
            calculate    
    𝑒  using equation (8) 
    endfor  
6. find     a     
    𝑒         
    
7.          
8.  transmit the packet to      and           
9. exit 
4. Simulation and Analysis of Results 
Simulations are performed in both road-based and map-based network enviroments. In road-based 
network, software defined road network with four junctions is considered. In map-based network, real road 
map of the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) is utilized. Three types of malicious vehicular environments 
are implemented. Firstly, single adversary vehicle is considered within the transmission range of each vehicles 
in the network. Secondly, mixed (one or two) adversary vehicles are considered. Some vehicles have single 
adversary and the remaining have two adversary vehicles within their transmission range. Thirdly, multiple 
(three or more) adversary vehicles are considered within the transmission range of each vehicle. Simulation 
results obtained for LIVES are compared with that of A-VIP. The results are also compared with that of W-
LIVES to assess the benefits of LIVES more clearly. W-LIVES is the modified implementation of SGR. W-
LIVES selects next hop vehicle according to the location claim of neighbour vehicles without verifying the 
claims. The benefits of the proposed location verification technique can be clearly understood with the help of 
this implementation.     
4.1 Performance Evaluation Metrics 
The performance evaluation metrics are defined below.  
 Location Error- The selection of adversary vehicles during one-hop transmission in packet forwarding is 
considered as location error, due the inability in recognizing fake location claims. The statistical formula 
utilized to calculate location error can be expressed as given by Eq. (9).  
                     {
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Where   
  represents the number of adversary vehicles selected in    simulation, and    represents the 
total number of adversary vehicles considered in the simulation.  
 Throughput- The number of packets successfully delivered from a source to the destination in per second 
time with the presence of fake location claims is considered as the throughput for a particular simulation 
run. The statistical formula utilized to calculate the throughput can be expressed as given by Eq. (10).  
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Where   
  
represents the number of packets sent in    simulation, and   
  
represents the number of 
packets lost in    simulation. 
 End-to-End Delay- The time taken by a packet in travelling across the vehicular network with the presence 
of fake location claims, starting from a source vehicle to the destination vehicle is considered as the end-to-
end delay of the packet. The statistical formula utilized to calculate the end-to-end delay can be expressed 
as given by Eq. (11).    
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Where    represents the number of packets received at the destination,     
  represents the sending time of 
   packet in    simulation and     
  represents the receiving time of    packet in    simulation. 
4.2 Simulation based on Road Network 
 
The simulations are carried out in network simulator NS-2 considering realistic vehicular network 
environments generated using Mobility model generator for Vehicular networks (MOVE). The essential 
scenario of the vehicular environments has been implemented using the two main modules of MOVE, namely, 
road map editor, and vehicle movement editor. The scenarios are represented by number of roads, number of 
lanes in each road, number of flows of vehicles in each lane, number of junctions in the area, positioning of 
traffic lights at junction points, speed of vehicles, and left or right turning probability of vehicles at different 
junctions. The simulation parameter setup is summarized in Table 1 which is approximately similar to the 
setup considered in [24]. Simulations are performed after setting the network and traffic environments with 
the aforementioned set of parameter values. The source vehicle and geographic region are randomly selected 
near the two pre-determined junctions which are kept same for all the ten simulation runs for recording results. 
Average of ten simulation runs is taken for each data value used in results.    
Table 1. Simulation Parameters and their considered values 
 
     Fig. 2(a) shows the impact of single adversary vehicle on the location error of LIVES and the state-of-the-
arts techniques. It can be clearly observed that the location error of LIVES is lower as compared to those of 
the state-of-the-arts techniques. For example, considering    adversary vehicles, location error is 
approximately      for LIVES whereas it is       and       in case of A-VIP and W-LIVES, respectively. 
Considering    adversary vehicles, it reaches up to      for LIVES, whereas      and       for A-VIP 
and W-LIVES, respectively.  Additionally, the increment in location error with the increase in number of 
Parameters Values Parameters Values Parameters Values 
Total time      𝑠 Ifqlen    packets Hello timeout     𝑠 
Simulation area             Channel type       𝑠𝑠 Query period     𝑠 
Vehicle speed          Antenna model                  Frequency          
Number of vehicles         vehicles Propagation model           Routing protocol SGR 
          vehicles MAC data rate     𝑠 Traffic type     
Packet senders    vehicles MAC protocol              Packet type     
Transmission range      CBR rate         𝑠 𝑠 Packet size         𝑠 
  𝑢   𝑛    
  𝑛      
0.25, 0.2, 0.1, 0.25, 0.2 
  𝑢 
    𝑛
   𝑠 
     𝑛
   
 
 𝑞  
   
400kbps, 250, 
60km/h, 350kbps, 1 
Thresholds (     0.9, 0.9 
adversary vehicles is also lower in case of LIVES as compared to those of A-VIP and W-LIVES. This is due 
to the usage of distributed tiles based location verification which effectively identifies false location claim by 
single adversary vehicle in the network. Although A-VIP also uses tiles based verification yet, the location 
error is higher as compared to that of LIVES due to the usage of server based verification in A-VIP. Server 
based verification requires to maintain reliable connectivity with servers which is quite challenging in 
vehicular environments. The location error of W-LIVES increases rapidly with the increase in number of 
adversary vehicles due to the absence of location verification technique.    
   
   
Fig. 2. Impact of number of adversary vehicles on location error with (a) single adversary, (b) mixed adversary, (c) multiple 
adversary vehicles (d) throughput, (e) end-to-end delay considering road-based network 
      Fig. 2(b) shows the impact of mixed adversary vehicles on the location error of LIVES and the state-of-
the-arts techniques. The results clearly states two things, firstly, the location error of LIVES is lower in 
comparison with those of the state-of-the-arts techniques. Secondly, location error with mixed adversary 
vehicles is higher as compared to the error with single adversary vehicle shown in Fig. 2(a). Specifically, 
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considering    adversary vehicles, the location errors are approximately             and        for 
LIVES, A-VIP and W-LIVES, respectively whereas the errors reach up to             and       with    
adversary vehicles. The increment in location error with the increase in number of adversary vehicles is lower 
in case of LIVES as compared to those of A-VIP and W-LIVES. This is because of the collective belief 
computation in the 2
nd
 layer location verification which effectively verifies the presence of mixed adversary 
vehicles in the network. A-VIP does not have 2
nd
 layer verification therefore, the rate of increment in location 
error is higher as compared to that of LIVES. Due to the presence of mixed adversary vehicles, rate of 
increment of location error is higher for W-LIVES which does not perform any location verification.   
Figure 2(c) shows the impact of multiple adversary vehicles on the location error of LIVES and the state-of-
the-arts techniques. It can be clearly observed that the location error with multiple adversary vehicles is higher 
as compared to the error with single adversary and mixed adversary vehicles shown in Fig. 2(a) and (b), 
respectively. In particular, considering    adversary vehicles, the location errors are approximately 
            and       for LIVES, A-VIP and W-LIVES, respectively, whereas the errors reaches up to 
            and       with    adversary vehicles. The increment in location error with the increase in 
number of adversary vehicles is lower in case of LIVES as compared to those of A-VIP and W-LIVES. The 
reason is the layer wise location verification which effectively recognizes multiple adversary vehicles in the 
network. The layer wise verification is not followed in A-VIP resulting in higher location error in comparison 
with that of LIVES in the presence of multiple adversary vehicles. The impact of multiple adversary vehicles 
on location error in case of the absence of verification technique can be clearly noted as the higher location 
error of W-LIVES. 
Fig. 2(d) shows the impact of location error caused by mixed adversary vehicles on the throughput of LIVES 
and the state-of-the-art techniques. The throughput of LIVES is higher as compared to those of the state-of-
the-art techniques. The rate of decrement of throughput with the increase of mixed adversary vehicles is lower 
for LIVES. Specifically, the throughput of LIVES is in the range          𝑠 whereas the ranges are 
         𝑠 and          𝑠 for A-VIP and W-LIVES, respectively. Fig. 2(e) shows the impact of 
location error with mixed adversary vehicles on the end-to-end delay of LIVES and the state-of-the-art 
techniques. The impact of location error on the end-to-end delay is lesser in case of LIVES which can be 
clearly observed as the lower and stable end-to-end delay in comparison with those of the state-of-the-art 
techniques. This is due to the lower location error of LIVES with mixed adversary vehicles as depicted in Fig. 
2(b). 
4.3 Simulation based on Map Network 
 
In this section, the performance of LIVES is analyzed using real road network of UTM. The Open Street Map 
is utilized to obtain the satellite image of UTM road network (see Fig 3(a)). ArcGIS 10.2.2 and MOVE is 
utilized to integrate vehicular network environments with the map (see Fig 3(b)). The other setup of the map-
based simulation is similar to the setup considered in [25].  
 
       
(a)                                                           (b) 
Fig. 3. The real road network of UTM: (a) Open Street Map view, (b) imported view in MOVE  
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Fig. 4. Impact of number of adversary vehicles on location error with (a) single adversary, (b) mixed adversary, (c) multiple 
adversary vehicles (d) throughput, (e) end-to-end delay considering map-based network 
       The impact of number of single adversary vehicles on the location error of LIVES and the state-of-the-art 
techniques with map-based network is presented in Fig. 4(a). The location error of LIVES with single 
adversary vehicles is significantly lower with map-based network as compared to the error with road-based 
network shown in Fig. 2(a). The location error of LIVES with map-based network is in the range 4 -10.3% 
whereas the error range is 5-19% with road-based network. This can be attributed to the presence of higher 
number of junctions in map-based network as compared to the only four junctions in road-based network. The 
presence of more junctions with map-based network results in better directional location verification which 
reduces location error. The location errors of A-VIP and W-LIVES are higher with map-based network in 
comparison with the errors with road-based network. In particular, the location error of A-VIP with map-
based network is in the range 11-42.1%, and the range is 25- 81% for W-LIVES. In road-based network, the 
error ranges are 8 -34%, and 20-73% for A-VIP and W-LIVES, respectively. This is due to the single layer 
verification of A-VIP, and no location verification in W-LIVES.  
       The impact of mixed adversary vehicles on the location error of LIVES and the state-of-the-arts 
techniques with map-based network is presented in Fig. 4(b). It can be observed that the location error of 
LIVES with map-based network is lower as compared to the error with road-based networks shown in Fig. 
2(b). The location error of LIVES with map-based network is in the range 6-15.1% whereas the range is 7-23% 
with road-based network. This can be attributed to the effective location verification of LIVES at junction 
points resulting in lower location error with map-based network having more junctions. The location errors of 
A-VIP and W-LIVES are in the range 17-45.6% and 46-87%, respectively with map-based network whereas 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Number of Adversary Vehicles on Map [Nav
M
]
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
w
it
h
 M
ix
e
d
 A
d
v
e
rs
a
ry
 [
K
b
p
s
]
 
 
SGR(LIVES)
GR(A-VIP)
GR(W-LIVES)
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Number of Adversary Vehicles on Map [Nav
M
]
E
E
D
 w
it
h
 M
ix
e
d
 A
d
v
e
rs
a
ry
 [
m
s
]
 
 
GR(W-LIVES)
GR(A-VIP)
SGR(LIVES)
(d) (e) 
the error ranges are 15-39% and 40-79% with road-based network. The impact of multiple adversary vehicles 
on the location error of LIVES and the state-of-the-art techniques is presented in Fig. 4(c). In case of LIVES, 
the lower location error range is observed with map-based networks as compared to the error range with road-
based network shown in Fig. 2(c). The error range of LIVES with map-based network is 7.3-20.2% whereas 
the error range is 9.5-27.2% with road-based network. This is due to the multiple adversary identification 
ability of 2
nd
 layer verification of LIVES which performs better with more junction. The location errors of A-
VIP and W-LIVES with map-based network are higher as compared to the error with road-based network. 
The location error ranges of A-VIP and W-LIVES are 19-54% and 53-94% with map-based network whereas 
the error ranges are 16-48% and 50-91% with road-based network. This is because of absence of layer wise 
verification for handling multiple adversary vehicles. The location verification problem worsens in dense road 
networks due to the availability of routes in different directions. 
       The impact of location error caused by mixed adversary vehicles on the throughput of LIVES and the 
state-of-the-art techniques with map-based network is shown in Fig. 4(d). The throughput of LIVES with map-
based network is higher as compared to those of the state-of-the-art techniques. Specifically, the throughput of 
LIVES with map-based network is in the range           𝑠 whereas the ranges are          𝑠 and 
        𝑠 in case of A-VIP and W-LIVES, respectively. The impact of location error caused by mixed 
adversary vehicles on the end-to-end delay of LIVES and the state-of-the-art techniques with map-based 
network is shown in Fig. 4(e). The impact of location error on the end-to-end delay of LIVES with map-based 
networks is lower as compared to those of the state-of-the-art techniques. It can be clearly observed as lower 
and stable end-to-end delay of LIVES in the results. The reason is the better location verification of LIVES 
with map-based network as shown in Fig. 4(b) for mixed adversary vehicles. 
4.4 Comparative Discussion between Road-based and Map-based Results 
The simulation results obtained considering the two different types of vehicular network environments are 
comparatively assessed for magnifying the performance benefits of the proposed location verification 
technique in realistic map-based environments (see Table 2). It can be clearly observed that the performance 
of LIVES improves in map-based environments whereas the performance of A-VIP and W-LIVES degrades 
in map-based environments. In particular, the average location errors of LIVES are            and       
for single, mixed and multiple adversary vehicles, respectively, with road-based environments whereas these 
errors are            and       with map-based environments.  The average throughput and end-to-end 
delay of SGR (LIVES) are 152Kbps and 10.5ms, respectively, in case of road-based environment whereas the 
through and end-to-end delay are 245Kbps and 5.7ms with map-based environment. The lower location error 
and end-to-end delay, and higher throughput of LIVES with map-based environment in comparison with the 
road-based environments can be attributed to the higher number of junctions in map-based environments. The 
more junctions result in better localization of vehicles, and thus, the throughput of LIVES increases and end-
to-end delay decreases. The average location errors of A-VIP are             and       for single, mixed 
and multiple adversary vehicles, respectively, with road-based environments whereas the locations errors are 
            and       with map-based environment.  The average throughput and end-to-end delay of GR 
(A-VIP) are       𝑠 and      𝑠, respectively, with road-based environments whereas the throughput and 
end-to-end delay are         𝑠 and      𝑠 with map-based environments. The performance degradation in 
terms of higher location error and end-to-end delay, and lower throughput with map-based network is because 
of the absence of second level verification in A-VIP. The mixed and multiple adversary vehicles are not 
recognizable in case of more junctions with map-based environment. These performance differences are 
higher in W-LIVES due to the selection of non-verified location of vehicles. 
 
Table 2. Comparative assessment of road-based and map-based simulation results 
                  Protocols and Traffic Environment  
     Metrics 
LIVES A-VIP W-LIVES 
Road Map Road Map Road Map 
 
 
 
 
Location Error 
Single 
Adversary 
Minimum 5 4 8 11 20 25 
Maximum 19 10.3 34 42.1 73 81 
Average 9.2 7.6 21.8 27.7 44.8 50.4 
Mixed 
Adversary 
Minimum 7 6 15 17 40 46 
Maximum 23 15.1 39 45.6 79 87 
Average 15.7 10.3 26.7 30.4 59.6 66.5 
Multiple 
Adversary 
Minimum 9.5 7.3 16 19 50 53 
Maximum 27.2 20.2 48 54 91 94 
Average 19.3 14.4 34.3 39.5 71.2 73.7 
 
Throughput 
Mixed 
Adversary 
Minimum 99 145 74 52 10 8 
Maximum 205 315 203 201 109 102 
Average 152 245.5 114 109.4 38.8 36.2 
 
End-to-End 
Delay 
Mixed 
Adversary 
Minimum 7 5 7.5 8.5 15 25 
Maximum 23 10 36 41 92 149 
Average 10.5 5.7 17.3 19.4 47.1 79.8 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, a two layered location verification technique is presented for geographic routing in VANETs. 
The first verification layer is based on the concept of virtual tiles on roads and received signal strength. The 
second layer verification is based on the belief of neighbor vehicles computed using TBM. From the design, 
implementation and evaluation of the location verification technique, following conclusions have been made. 
The single adversary vehicles can be effectively identified using virtual tiles and received signal strength 
based first layer verification of LIVES. The TBM based second layer verification of LIVES is required for 
identifying mixed and multiple adversary vehicles. The location verification capability of LIVES significantly 
improves with map-based realistic network environments due to the higher number of junctions. In future, 
authors will focus on enhancing the accuracy of GPS-based location of non-adversary vehicles using the 
concept of cooperative positioning.  Addressing GPS outage issue in urban vehicular environment will also be 
the quest.  
Acknowledgements  
The research is supported by Ministry of Education Malaysia (MOE) and conducted in collaboration with 
Research Management Center (RMC) at University Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) under VOT NUMBER: 
RJ130000.7828.4F708. 
References 
[1] Ahmed, S.H., Bouk, S.H., Yaqub, M.A. el al.: ‘CODIE: COntrolled Data and Interest Evaluation in Vehicular Named Data 
Networks’, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2016, 65, (6), pp. 3954-3963 
[2] Papadimitratos, P., De La Fortelle, A., Evenssen, K. et al.: ‘Vehicular communication systems: Enabling technologies, 
applications, and future outlook on intelligent transportation’, IEEE Communications Magazine, 2009, 47, (11), pp. 84-95 
[3] Kaiwartya, O., Kumar, S.: ‘Cache agent-based geocasting in VANETs’, International Journal of Information and 
Communication Technology, 2015, 7, (6), pp.562-584 
[4] Suthaputchakun, C., Sun, Z.: ‘Routing protocol in inter vehicle communication systems: a survey’, IEEE Communications 
Magazine, 2011, 49, (12), pp.150-156 
[5] Ansari, K., Feng, Y., Singh, J.: ‘Study of a geo-multicast framework for efficient message dissemination at unmanned level 
crossings’, IET Intelligent Transport Systems, 2013, 8,(4), pp. 425-434 
[6] Cao, Y., Sun, Z., Wang, N., et al.: ‘Geographic-based spray-and-relay (GSaR): an efficient routing scheme for DTNs’, IEEE 
Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2015, 64, (4), pp.1548-1564 
[7] Kaiwartya, O., Kumar, S, Lobiyal, D. K., et al.: ‘Multi-objective dynamic vehicle routing problem and time seed based 
solution using particle swarm optimization’, Journal of Sensors, 2015, 15, (1), pp1-14 
[8] Fonseca, A., Vazao, T.: ‘Applicability of Position-Based Routing for VANET in Highways and Urban Environment’, Journal 
of Network and Computer Applications, 2013, 36, (1), pp. 961–973 
[9] Fiore, M., Casetti, C.E.,  Chiasserini, C. et al.: ‘Discovery and Verification of Neighbor Positions in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks’, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2013, 12, (2), pp. 289-303 
[10] Cai, Y., Wang, H., Chen, X., et al.: ‘Trajectory-based anomalous behaviour detection for intelligent traffic surveillance’, IET 
Intelligent Transport Systems, 2015, 9, (8), pp. 810-816 
[11] Pathak, V., Yao, D., L. I.: ‘Securing location aware services over VANET using geographical secure path routing’, Proc. IEEE 
Int. Conf. Vehicular Electronics and Safety (ICVES), Columbus, OH, US, September 2008, pp.346-353,  
[12] Fogue, M., Martinez, F., Garrido, P., et al.: ‘Securing Warning Message Dissemination in VANETs using Cooperative 
Neighbor Position Verification’, IEEE Transaction on Vehicular Technology, 2014, 64, (6), pp. 2538-2550 
[13] Mejri, M.N., Ben-Othman, J., Hamdi, M.: ‘Survey on VANET Security Challenges and Possible Cryptographic Solutions’, 
Vehicular Communications, 2014, 1, (2), pp. 53-66 
[14] Sheet, D.K., Kaiwartya, O., Abdullah, A.H. et al.: ‘Location Information Verification cum Security Using TBM in Geocast 
Routing’, In proceedings of ICECCS, Procedia Computer Science, 2015, 70, pp. 219-225 
[15] Malandrino, F., Borgiattino, C., Casetti, C. et al.: ‘Verification and Inference of Positions in Vehicular Networks through 
Anonymous Beaconing’, IEEE Transaction on Mobile Computing, 2014, 13, (10), pp. 2415-2428 
[16] Zhang, P., Zhang, Z., Boukerche, A.: ‘Cooperative location verification for vehicular ad-hoc networks’, Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. 
Communications (ICC), Ottawa, ON, Canada, June 2012, pp. 37-41 
[17] Abumansoor, O., Boukerche, A.: ‘A Secure Cooperative Approach for Nonline-of-Sight Location Verification in VANET’, 
IEEE Transaction on Vehicular Technology, 2012, 61, (1), pp. 275-285 
[18] Leinmuller, T., Schoch, E., Kargl, F.: ‘Position Verification Approaches For Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks’, IEEE Journal on 
Wireless Communications, 2006, 13(5), pp. 16-21 
[19] Fiore, M., Casetti, C., Chiasserini, C.F., et al.: ‘Discovery and verification of neighbor positions in mobile ad hoc networks’, 
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2013, 12, (2), pp. 289-303 
[20] Zeng, Y., Cao, J., Hong, J., et al.: ‘Secure localization and location verification in wireless sensor networks: a survey’, The 
Journal of Supercomputing, 2013, 64, (3), 685-701 
[21] Engoulu,R G., Bellaïche, M., Pierre, S., et al.: ‘VANET security surveys’, Computer Communications, 2014, 44, (1), pp. 1-13 
[22] Pathan, ASK.: ‘Security of self-organizing networks: MANET, WSN, WMN, VANET’, CRC press, (Ed.) 2010. 
[23] Smets, P., Kennes, R.: ‘The transferable belief model’, Artificial intelligence, 1994, 66, (2), pp. 191-234 
[24] Kaiwartya, O., Kumar, S.: ‘Guaranteed Geocast Routing Protocol for Vehicular Adhoc Networks in Highway Traffic 
Environment’, Wireless Personal Communications, 2015, 83, (4), pp. 257-2682 
[25] Kaiwartya, O., Kumar, S, Lobiyal, D.K., et al.: ‘Performance improvement in geographic routing for vehicular Ad Hoc 
networks’, Sensors, 2014, 14, (12), pp. 22342-22371 
 
